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the death penalty. [d. at 262,600 A.2d 
at 425. The court emphasized that this 
was a capital prosecution, and there-
fore involved an enhanced punishment. 
It compared the case at bar to others 
involving enhanced sentencing for re-
cidivists in which it had required more 
than identical names to support a pre-
sumption of identity of person. [d. at 
264-5, 600 A.2d at 426. 
The court cited as persuasive au-
thority cases from other jurisdictions 
in which a witness attrial was unable to 
identify the defendant as the person 
who had previously confessed to him. 
[d. at261, 600 A.2dat424 (citing York 
v. State, 173 N.W.2d 693 (Wis. 1970); 
Fisherv. State, 361 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1962)). In those cases 
testimony concerning the confessions 
was admitted and the convictions were 
affinned on appeal. The appellate 
courts relied on the fact that other 
witnesses, who were present but did 
not hear the confessions, were able to 
identify the defendants at trial and place 
them in the company of the witnesses 
who heard and testified to the confes-
sions. 
Thus, the court reasoned that while 
Spells was able to identify the person 
who had confessed to him by name, 
nickname, and the fact that he had a 
mid-body injury, his failure to identify 
the petitioner at trial, combined with 
the lack of any evidence that the two 
men were together in jail, resulted in an 
inadequate evidentiary foundation to 
admit the testimony. Woodson, 325 
Md. at 263, 600 A.2d at 425. ''To 
admit such evidence," the court stated, 
"would be, for example, to sanction the 
testimony of any witness who, without 
more, claims that a voice on the tele-
phone, which he cannot recognize as 
the defendant's, identified himself us-
ing the name of the defendant, and 
confessed to the crime." [d. 
The court acknowledged that there 
is some authority that "[i]dentical 
names give rise to a presumption of 
identity of person." The court rea-
soned however, "[a]ssuming, 
arguendo, that the use of Woodson's 
name alone would raise a rebuttable 
presumption of identity, the presump-
tion was nullified when Spells testified 
that the person who confessed to him 
was not in the courtroom." [d. at 264, 
600 A.2d at 426. The court held that in 
the circumstances of the case, Spells' 
conversation was inadmissible hear-
say, and to admit it was reversible error 
requiring remand for a new trial. [d. 
It appears from the ruling in 
Woodson that when considering the 
admissibility of confessions in the con-
text enhanced sentence cases, the Gourt 
of Appeals of Maryland will construe 
the "circumstances of the case" broadly. 
Such breadth illustrates the court's dis-
tinction of the penalty as part and par-
cel of the circumstances surrounding 
the confession. 
- Chris Marts 
Molzo/ v. United States: SUPREME 
COURT CHOOSES TRADI-
TIONAL DEFINITION FOR "PU-
NITIVE DAMAGES" UNDER 
FEDERAL TORTS CLAIMS ACT. 
In the wake of the intense contro-
versy surrounding his appointment to 
the nation's highest court, Justice 
Clarence Thomas wrote his first United 
States Supreme Court opinion for the 
Court's unanimous decision to follow 
tradition when defming "punitive dam-
ages" under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, 
the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA). 
In Molzo/v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 
711 (1992), the Court undertook an 
exercise in statutory interpretation by 
following deeply rooted common law 
principles requiring proof of a 
defendant's culpability before a plain-
tiff can recover punitive damages. As 
such, punitive damages under the 
FTCA are a specific category of dam-
ages, the recovery of which depends on 
proof ofintentional or flagrant conduct 
and the purpose of which is to punish a 
defendant for such conduct. 
The guardian ad litem of Mr. Rob-
ert Molzof brought an action against 
the U.S. Government after Mr. Molzof 
sustained irreversable brain damage 
that left him comatose in a Veterans 
Administration hospital as a result of 
the employees' negligence. Mr. Molzof 
sought damages under the FTCA for 
supplemental medical care, future 
medical expenses, and loss of enjoy-
ment of life. 
The Government conceded to neg-
ligence, and at the conclusion of the 
bench trial concerning only damages, 
the Federal District Court ordered the 
hospital to continue the level of care it 
had already been providing Molzof in 
addition to paying for weekly doctor's 
visits and care beyond that which the 
hospital could offer. The court re-
fused, however, to award damages re-
flecting the cost of care already avail-
able or damages for loss of enjoyment 
of life. Mr. Molzof died after final 
judgement from the district court, at 
which time Mrs. Shirley Molzof re-
sumed the action as the personal repre-
sentative of her husband's estate. 
Mrs. Molzoftook exception to the 
limitations the district court placed on 
recovery for Mr. Molzofsdemise. The 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit nevertheless agreed with the lower 
court and maintained that any award 
exceeding compensation, including 
loss of enjoyment of life, was "puni-
tive in effect" and beyond recovery 
under the Federal Torts Claim Act. 
112 S. Ct. at 714. The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
order to define "punitive damages" 
under the FTCA. 
The Court began its analysis by 
examining the history behind the 
FTCA. Having tolerated a laborious 
legislative process for compensating 
those individuals injured by federal 
emp loyees' negligence, Congress 
passed the FTCA. The legislation 
would allow such victims to sue the 
U.S. Government and recover through 
a limited waiver of the Government's 
sovereign immunity. The Court recog-
nized that, although state law must be 
consulted in order to determine the 
extent to which the United States can 
be held liable under the FTCA, "puni-
tive damages" would in no way recov-
____________________________ 22.3/The Law Forum - 35 
erable under the FfCA. Id. at 714-15. 
In an effort to detennine if damages 
from loss of enjoyment of life and 
duplicate fees were prohibited as ''pu-
nitive damages" in the FfCA, the Court 
considered definitions from both par-
ties. Mrs. Molzof suggested that the 
Court refer to traditional common law 
and choose a standard for classifying 
punitive damages as those intended to 
punish a defendant for "egregious con-
duct." Mrs. Molzof asserted that. be-
cause her claimed damages did not 
involve egregious conduct. she should 
be able to recover. Id. at 715. In 
contrast. the Government suggested 
defming punitive damages as any award 
which is not strictly compensatory. 
This strict definition would disallow 
recovery of damages which exceeded a 
plaintiffs actual loss. The Govern-
ment substantiated its position by sug-
gesting that such extra-compensatory 
awards are ''punitive in effect.·· Id. 
After distinguishing ''punitive dam-
ages" from damages which are ''puni-
tive in effect." the Court accepted the 
Mrs. Molzofs proposed definition. Id. 
The Court explained that ''punitive 
damages" is a tenn of art which re-
quires no explanation in American le-
gal circles. and that Congress spent 28 
years grappling over the details of the 
FfCAbefore it became law. Id. at716. 
In light of these realities. the Court 
decided it must adopt the widely ac-
cepted definition of ''punitive dam-
ages:' i.e .• those "awarded to punish 
defendants for torts committed with 
fraud. malice. violence. or oppression." 
in the absence of language to the con-
trary in the FfCA or its legislative 
history. Id. at 717. By drawing the 
distinction between ''punitive dam-
ages" and those damages which are 
''punitive in effect." the Court quickly 
disqualified the Government's argu-
ment as inconsistent with the statutory 
language of the FfCA. 
The Court opined that the Govern-
ment premised its argument on the 
assumption that FfCA's limited waiver 
of sovereign immunity would not al-
low damages other than those that are 
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compensatory. The Court viewed such 
a premise as a distortion ofthe actual 
statutory language which clearly indi-
cates that a plaintiff may recover those 
damages "not legally considered 'pu-
nitivedamages', butwhichareforsome 
reason above and beyond ordinary no-
tions of compensation .... " Id. at 716. 
A jury's award to a plaintiff beyond 
that which seems actually compensa-
tory would not automatically fall in the 
category of''punitive damages." Such 
an excess would relate only to the 
amount and not the nature of the dam-
ages. The Court explained that they 
must embody the element of the 
defendant's culpability before exces-
sive damages would be deemed puni-
tive in nature under the common law. 
Id. 
The Court noted three problems 
with the Government's argument. First, 
interpreting ''punitive damages" as any 
damages in excess of or not related to 
actual compensation for loss, as the 
Government suggested, would make it 
extremely difficult for a court to tabu-
late the award and result in outlandish 
judgments. For example, to avoid 
double payment from the Government, 
a court would have to consider the 
plaintiffs day-to-day savings, such as 
rent and utilities, which would result 
from an award of future medical ex-
penses. The Court felt that this effort 
would be far too meticulous for courts 
to undertake. Yet, because common 
law has traditionally considered double 
and treble damages as a form of pun i-
tive damages, such duplicative pay-
ments would necessarily have to be 
nonrecoverable under the 
Government's proposed meaning of 
the FfCA. Id. at 717. 
Secondly, with regard to the spec-
trum of claims under the FfCA to 
which liquidated damages or fixed lev-
els of compensation apply, an interpre-
tation of "punitive damages" as of-
fered by the Government would force 
courts into the business of figuring the 
actual loss in every case before them. 
Id. It often happens that these types of 
awards do not correspond to the 
plaintiffs actual loss. According to 
the Government's strict proposed defi-
nition, such awards would be ''puni-
tive damages," and therefore not re-
coverable, if they exceeded the 
plaintiffs actual loss. 
The third problem the Court found 
with the Government's argument in-
volved it's reliance on the previous 
efforts of the Court to depart from 
traditional common law principles. 
None ofthose efforts related to statu-
tory tenns that are as deeply rooted flS 
the concept of ''punitive damages." 
Various terms in the FfCA, such as 
"discretionary function," have few an-
tecedents from which to draw a sound 
definition. Id. Likewise. there is some-
times no basis in the common law of 
most states from which to drawamean-
ing. Only then is it necessary for the 
Court to depart from traditional com-
mon law principles. Id. 
As far as Mrs. Molzofs claims 
were concerned. the Court concluded 
that only those damages which are 
legally defined as ''punitive damages" 
under the common law are not recover-
able under the FfCA. According to 
this defmition. damages associated with 
loss of enjoyment oflife and duplicate 
costs do not fall in this nonrecoverable 
category of damages. but the lower 
court would have to examine Wiscon-
sin law and detennine exactly which 
damages Mrs. Molzof could recover. 
Id. at 718. 
The Court's conclusion in MolzoJ 
leaves virtually no question unanswered 
concerning the classification of''puni-
tive damages." Courts relying on the 
language and structure ofthe FfCA to 
decide the nature of awards sought 
against the Government now have a 
workable standard for producing con-
sistent results. The decision in MolzoJ 
seems to attenuate cynicism regarding 
the Supreme Court' s alleged conserva-
tive reputation by deciding against the 
Government's interests and showing 
sympathy for plaintiffs. This decision 
may convey a message that today's 
Court is striving for consistent adjudica-
tion of claims under statutes like the 
FTCA by relying on the plain, clear, 
and established meaning of the terms 
therein. Such a reliance may simplify 
the process of determining awards for 
lower courts in the future. 
- Mike Muldowney 
Lechmere. Inc. v. NLRE: 
NONEMPLOYEE UNION OR-
GANIZERS MAY BE BARRED 
FROM AN EMPLOYER'S PROP-
ERTY ABSENT A SHOWING OF 
INACCESSIBILITY OF EM-
PLOYEES. 
In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRE, 112 S. 
Ct. 841 (1992), the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its earlier interpretation of 
nonemployee union organizational 
rights, and specifically rejected a trend 
recently adopted by the National Labor 
Relations Board (" Board"). The Court 
held that an employer may prohibit 
nonemployee union organizers from 
entering upon its property, where rea-
sonable access to employees may be 
had elsewhere. In so doing, the Court 
explicitly rejected the Board's applica-
tion of a balancing testto determine the 
rights of non employee union organiz-
ers. 
In 1987, Local 919 of the United 
Food and Commercial Workers Union 
("Union") began a campaign aimed at 
organizing the non-represented em-
ployees ofLechrnere, Inc., a retail store 
located in Newington, Connecticut. On 
several occasions, the union organiz-
ers entered Lechmere's parking lot 
without permission and began placing 
handbills on the cars of Lechmere's 
employees. On each occasion, 
Lechrnere's manager asked the union 
organizers to leave company property 
and then removed the handbills. The 
union organizers continued their orga-
nizational activities and began picket-
ing Lechmere's store from an area ad-
jacent to the company parking lot. 
Through additional efforts, the Union 
was ableto contact approximately 20% 
of Lechmere's employees by mail, 
many of whom lived in the surround-
ing metropolitan area. 
When the Union's organizational 
attempts failed to yield any success, 
they filed an unfair laborpractice charge 
with the Board. An administrative law 
judge ruled in favor of the Union and 
recommended, in part, that Lechmere 
be ordered to allow the Union onto its 
property. The Board affirmed this 
ruling and adopted the judge's recom-
mendation, applying the analysis of its 
opinion inJean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 
11 (1988). The United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit denied 
Lechrnere's petition for review and 
enforced the Board's order. The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari, reversed 
the judgment of the First Circuit, and 
denied enforcement ofthe Board's or-
der. 
In an opinion by Justice Thomas, 
the Court began its analysis by looking 
to the National Labor Relations Act 
("Act"). The Court noted that section 
7 of the Act gave employees the right 
to organize or join a labor union. The 
Court further noted that this right is 
protected by section 8(a)(I), which 
makes it an unfair labor practice for an 
employer to interfere or restrict the 
exercise of this right by employees. 
Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 845. As the 
Court pointed out, there is a "critical 
distinction between the organizing ac-
tivities of employees . . . and 
nonemployees .... " Id. The Court 
held that the Act "confers rights only 
on employees, not on unions or their 
nonemployee organizers." Id. (em-
phasis in original). However, the Court 
did recognize that, under some circum-
stances, the Act may restrict an 
employer's right to exclude union or-
ganizers who are not employees. 
The Court next reviewed relevant 
case law dealing with this issue and 
determined as a general rule that "an 
employer cannot be compelled to al-
low distribution of union literature by 
nonemployee organizers on his prop-
erty." Id. at 846 (quoting NLRE v. 
Babcock& Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 
112 (1956». In addition, the Court 
noted that the exception to this rule 
was extremely narrow, and that "[t]o 
gain access, the union has the burden 
of showing that no reasonable means 
[of reaching] the employees exists .. 
.. " Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 847 (quot-
ing Sears, Roebuck& Co. v. San Diego 
County District Council of Carpen-
ters, 436 U.S. 180, 205 (1978». 
The Court concluded that the facts 
in this case did not justify an applica-
tion of this narrow exception to the 
general rule that an employer may re-
strict nonemployee distribution of 
union literature on company property. 
Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 848. The 
Court held that the Union had reason-
able alternative means to reach the 
employees, and in so finding, specifi-
cally rejected the Board's conclusion 
with repect to this issue. Id. at 848-49. 
The Court explained that nonemployee 
organizers could only compel an em-
ployer to open his property to their 
organizational efforts where" the loca-
tion ofa plant and the living quarters of 
the employees place the employees 
beyond the reach of [the Union]." Id. 
(quoting Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 
at 113). Although reaching the em-
ployees at their homes may have been 
"cumbersome or less-than-ideally ef-
fective," this fact did not bring the 
Union within the narrow inaccessibil-
ity exception enumerated in Babcock. 
Id. 
The Court explicitly rejected the 
Board's application ofa balancing test 
to this factual situation. In finding an 
unfair labor practice, the Board relied 
upon its holding inJean Country where 
they determined that an employer's 
property rights could be infringed in 
favor of the rights of an organization. 
Id. at 849 (citing Jean Country, 291 
N.L.R.B. 11 (1988». This analysis, 
however, failed to take into consider-
ation the distinction between the rights 
of employee organizers and those of 
nonemployee organizers. Lechmere. 
112 S. Ct. at 849. The Court decided, 
therefore, that the Board's application 
of a balancing test was inappropriate in 
that it was inconsistent with the Court's 
prior decisions. Id. The Court also 
stated that a balancing test was inap-
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